Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions : the GSM spectrum auction in Germany

Veronika Grimm; Frank Riedel; Elmar Wolfstetter

The second-generation GSM spectrum auction in Germany is probably the most clear cut example of a low price outcome in a simultaneous ascending-bid auction.The present paper gives an account of the events, describes the auction rules and market conditions, and provides a theoretical explanation of low price equilibria in simultaneous, ascending-bid auctions.In particular it is shown that the low price equilibrium that implements the efficient allocation is the unique perfect equilibrium of that game.

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Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	Grimm, Veronika ; Riedel, Frank ; Wolfstetter, Elmar
Publisher:	München : CESifo
Subject:	Multi-unit auctions \| spectrum auctions \| telecommunications \| industrial organization \| game theory \| Mobilkommunikation \| Mobile communications \| Auktionstheorie \| Auction theory \| Konzession \| Concession \| Deutschland \| Germany \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Funktechnik \| Radio engineering \| Ausschreibung \| Competitive tendering \| Auktion \| Auction \| Telekommunikation \| Telecommunications \| Industrieökonomik \| Industrial organization