Lying generators : manipulability of centralized payoff mechanisms in electrical energy trade
Year of publication: |
December 2016
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Authors: | Csercsik, Dávid |
Published in: |
Central European journal of operations research : CEJOR ; official journal of the Austrian, Croatian, Czech, Hungarian, Slovakian and Slovenian OR Societies. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1435-246X, ZDB-ID 1178875-6. - Vol. 24.2016, 4, p. 923-937
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Subject: | Electricity networks | Power | Optimal power flow | Elektrizitätswirtschaft | Electric power industry | Elektrizität | Electricity | Elektrizitätsversorgung | Electricity supply | Strompreis | Electricity price | Theorie | Theory | Energiehandel | Energy trade | Elektrizitätspolitik | Electricity policy |
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