Majority voting and the single-crossing property when voters belong to separate groups

We provide conditions under which a Condorcet winner exists when voters are exogenously distributed in groups, with preferences satisfying the single-crossing property separately inside each group. We also show that the majority voting social preference is acyclic.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	De Donder, Philippe
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 118.2013, 3, p. 523-525
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Spence–Mirrlees condition \| Unidimensional policy space \| Median voter \| Anchors

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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