Making and breaking coalitions : strategic sophistication and prosociality in majority decisions
Year of publication: |
2022
|
---|---|
Authors: | Sauermann, Jan ; Schwaninger, Manuel ; Kittel, Bernhard |
Published in: |
European journal of political economy. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0176-2680, ZDB-ID 623005-2. - Vol. 71.2022, p. 1-13
|
Subject: | Bargaining | Coalition formation | Majority rule | Social preferences | Strategic sophistication | Koalition | Coalition | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Experiment | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Entscheidung | Decision | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice |
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