Managerial Ability, Compensation, and the Closed-End Fund Discount
This paper shows that the existence of managerial ability, combined with the labor contract prevalent in the industry, implies that the closed-end fund discount should exhibit many of the primary features documented in the literature. We evaluate the model's ability to match the quantitative features of the data, and find that it does well, although there is some observed behavior that remains to be explained. Copyright 2007 by The American Finance Association.
Year of publication: |
2007
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Authors: | BERK, JONATHAN B. ; STANTON, RICHARD |
Published in: |
Journal of Finance. - American Finance Association - AFA, ISSN 1540-6261. - Vol. 62.2007, 2, p. 529-556
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Publisher: |
American Finance Association - AFA |
Saved in:
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