Managerial discretion and debt financing under information uncertainty
Year of publication: |
2024
|
---|---|
Authors: | Liu, Yu-Hong ; Jiang, I-Ming ; Huang, Hung-Chieh |
Published in: |
The financial review : the official publication of the Eastern Finance Association. - Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 1540-6288, ZDB-ID 2068470-8. - Vol. 59.2024, 4, p. 1003-1026
|
Subject: | agency conflicts | debt financing | information uncertainty | managerial compensation | noise | Fremdkapital | Debt financing | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Kapitalstruktur | Capital structure | Führungskräfte | Managers | Theorie | Theory | Risiko | Risk | Managervergütung | Executive compensation |
-
Executive risk-taking and the agency cost of debt
Imes, Matthew, (2021)
-
CEO turnover, information uncertainty, and debt contracting
Deng, Saiying, (2019)
-
Managerial incentives, net debt and investment activity in all-equity firms
Alderson, Michael J., (2012)
- More ...
-
THE VALUATION OF RESET OPTIONS WHEN UNDERLYING ASSETS ARE AUTOCORRELATED
Liu, Yu-Hong, (2011)
-
Influence of investor subjective judgments in investment decision-making
Liu, Yu-hong, (2012)
-
Valuation of double trigger catastrophe options with counterparty risk
Jiang, I-Ming, (2013)
- More ...