Managerial Incentive Problems: The Role of Multiple Signals

Career concerns can mitigate moral hazard problems, but these diminish as the agent's retirement age approaches. Addressing this problem, this note draws attention to the role of the interaction between contractible and non-contractible signals.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2015-03-11
Authors:	Ogaku, Michiko
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 35.2015, 1, p. 106-111
Publisher:	AccessEcon
Subject:	Career concerns \| Moral hazard \| Non-contractible signals \| Contractible signals

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D8 - Information and Uncertainty
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011199637