Managerial risk-taking behavior : a too-big-to-fail story
Year of publication: |
April (II) 2018
|
---|---|
Authors: | Zardkoohi, Asghar ; Kang, Eugene Soon Lee ; Fraser, Donald ; Cannella, Albert A. <Jr.> |
Published in: |
Journal of business ethics : JOBE. - Dordrecht : Springer, ISSN 0167-4544, ZDB-ID 868017-6. - Vol. 149.2018, 1, p. 221-233
|
Subject: | Too-big-to-fail | Moral hazard | Excessive risk-taking behavior | Performance | Moral Hazard | Risikopräferenz | Risk attitude | Risikomanagement | Risk management | Bankrisiko | Bank risk | Führungskräfte | Managers | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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