Mandanten von Anwälten wollen kein Stundenhonorar
Year of publication: |
2016
|
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Authors: | Seldeslachts, Jo |
Published in: |
DIW Wochenbericht. - Berlin : Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), ISSN 1860-8787. - Vol. 83.2016, 10, p. 195-199
|
Publisher: |
Berlin : Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) |
Subject: | lawyers' fee arrangements | clients' choices | discrete choice models |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Article |
Language: | German |
Other identifiers: | 853468591 [GVK] hdl:10419/129768 [Handle] |
Classification: | C25 - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; K10 - Basic Areas of Law. General ; K40 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior. General |
Source: |
-
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What clients want: Choices between lawyers' offerings
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Paying by the hour: The least appealing option for clients of lawyers
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