Manipulation of the Borda rule by introduction of a similar candidate

In an election contest, a losing candidate a can manipulate the election outcome in his favor by introducing a weak similar candidate WSC in the choice set, the WSC b being defined as an alternative which is ranked immediatly below a in the individual preferences. We characterize the voting situations where this manipulation is efficient for the Borda rule and express its vulnerability for a 3 alternative election.

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Serais, Jérôme
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 31.2011, 1, p. 749-758
Publisher:	AccessEcon
Subject:	Borda rule \| Manipulation \| Strategic candidacy \| Similar candidate

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Language:	English
Classification:	D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008853890