Market evidence on investor preference for fewer directorships
Year of publication: |
2020
|
---|---|
Authors: | Bar-Hava, Keren ; Gu, Feng ; Lev, Baruch |
Published in: |
Journal of financial and quantitative analysis : JFQA. - Seattle, Wash. : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1756-6916, ZDB-ID 2010249-5. - Vol. 55.2020, 3, p. 931-954
|
Subject: | Board of Directors | Board of directors | Arbeitsgestaltung | Job design | Anlageverhalten | Behavioural finance | Kapitalanlage | Financial investment |
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