Market performance and collusion in sequential and simultaneous multi-object auctions: Evidence from an ascending auctions experiment

We compare efficiency and susceptibility to collusion of two alternative ways to sell multiple objects in independent private values environments: simultaneous and sequential ascending auctions. Both auctions are common in the real world. With explicit communication among bidders, collusion was more frequent in sequential than in simultaneous auctions. We further analyze collusive schemes adopted by bidders.

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Year of publication:	2008
Authors:	Sherstyuk, Katerina ; Dulatre, Jeremy
Published in:	International Journal of Industrial Organization. - Elsevier, ISSN 0167-7187. - Vol. 26.2008, 2, p. 557-572
Publisher:	Elsevier

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005500013