Markets for Influence
We specify an oligopoly game, where firms choose quantity in order to maximise profits, that is strategically equivalent to a standard Tullock rent- seeking game. We then show that the Tullock game may be interpreted as an oligopsonistic market for in?uence. Alternative specifications of the strategic variable give rise to a range of Nash equilibria with varying levels of rent dissipation
Year of publication: |
2009-09
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Authors: | Menezes, Flavio ; Quiggin, John |
Institutions: | Risk and Sustainable Management Group (RSMG), School of Economics |
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