Matching to share risk
Pierre-André Chiappori, Philip J. Reny
We consider a matching model in which individuals belonging to two populations (\textquotedblleft males\textquotedblright\ and \textquotedblleft females\textquotedblright ) can match to share their exogenous income risk. Within each population, individuals can be ranked by risk aversion in the Arrow-Pratt sense. The model permits non transferable utility, a context in which few general results have previously been derived. We show that in this framework a stable matching always exists, it is generically unique, and it is negatively assortative: for any two matched couples, the more risk averse male is matched with the less risk averse female.
Year of publication: |
January 2016
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Authors: | Chiappori, Pierre-André ; Reny, Philip J. |
Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : Wiley, ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 11.2016, 1, p. 227-251
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Subject: | Negatively assortative matching | risk-sharing | stable match | Matching | Risiko | Risk | Suchtheorie | Search theory |
Saved in:
freely available
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.3982/TE1914 [DOI] hdl:10419/150277 [Handle] |
Classification: | D00 - Microeconomics. General ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011672274