Matching with slot-specific priorities : theory
Scott Duke Kominers (Society of Fellows, Harvard University), Tayfun Sönmez (Department of Economics, Boston College)
| Year of publication: |
May 2016
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Kominers, Scott Duke ; Sönmez, Tayfun |
| Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric Society. - New York, NY : Econometric Society, ISSN 1933-6837, ZDB-ID 2398911-7. - Vol. 11.2016, 2, p. 683-710
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| Subject: | Market design | matching with contracts | stability | strategy-proofness | school choice | affirmative action | airline seat upgrades | Matching | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Theorie | Theory |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.3982/TE1839 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011500742