Maximal Extractable Value and the Blockchain Commons

This paper shows how some MEV practices, resulting in unfair appropriation of the value created by all users, by a small set of blockchains actors is similar to free-riding. In particular we demonstrate that this new form of free-riding is made possible precisely by the design of blockchains that aims at preventing classical forms of free-riding. This also entails that non-cooperative game theory is not adequate to solve the issues raised by such MEV practices. We thus turn to cooperative games, in particular in the case of Commons goods. After recalling that blockchains are a specific type of Commons goods we dwell on Ostrom’s theory of the governance of the Commons, in particular on her design principles to analyze MEV practices and their impact on users confidence in the network. We then go on proposing new avenues for possible solutions, based on collective participation and we note that a trust-based solution may be efficient to sustain confidence