Maximal Loss from Collusion in the IPV Symmetric Auctions

We derive a bound on the seller’s relative revenue loss from an unanticipated bidders’ collusion in the optimal auctions. Under the standard hazard rate assumption the relative loss is at most 1 3 when there are just two bidders. The measure of the loss is increasing with the number of bidders, but at a rather slow rate.

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Year of publication:	2006-07
Authors:	Pavlov, Gregory
Institutions:	Department of Economics, Boston University
Subject:	Collusion \| Auctions

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Series:	Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number WP2006-037 09 pages
Classification:	D44 - Auctions ; L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004972909