Mechanism design by observant and informed planners
Year of publication: |
2022
|
---|---|
Authors: | Chatterji, Shurojit ; Sen, Arunava |
Subject: | Local strategy-proofness | Strategy-proofness | Unanimity | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Öffentliche Güter | Public goods | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Allokation | Allocation |
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