Mechanism design under approximate incentive compatibility

Santiago R. Balseiro, Omar Besbes, Francisco Castro

Year of publication:	2024
Authors:	Balseiro, Santiago R. ; Besbes, Omar ; Castro, Francisco
Published in:	Operations research. - Linthicum, Md. : INFORMS, ISSN 1526-5463, ZDB-ID 2019440-7. - Vol. 72.2024, 1, p. 355-372
Subject:	approximate incentive compatibility \| duality \| infinite dimensional linear programs \| mechanism design \| Optimization \| revenue maximization \| satisficing behavior \| Mechanismus-Design-Theorie \| Mechanism design \| Mathematische Optimierung \| Mathematical programming \| Anreiz \| Incentives \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Begrenzte Rationalität \| Bounded rationality

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