Mechanism Design when players' Preferences and information coincide

It is well known that when players have private information, vis a vis the designer, and their preferences coincide it is hard to implement the socially desirable outcome. We show that with arbitrarily small fines and arbitrarily noisy inspections, the social choice correspondence can be fully implemented (truth telling is the unique Nash equilibrium).

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Year of publication:	2016-12-02
Authors:	Dubra, Juan ; Caffera, Marcelo ; Figueroa, Nicolás

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Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Dubra, Juan and Caffera, Marcelo and Figueroa, Nicolás (2016): Mechanism Design when players' Preferences and information coincide.
Classification:	D70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making. General ; Q50 - Environmental Economics. General
Source:	BASE

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015254187