Mechanism design with aftermarkets : on the impossibility of pure information intermediation

Piotr Dworczak

A mediator, with no prior information and no control over the market protocol, attempts to redesign the information structure in the market by running an information intermediation mechanism with transfers that first elicits information from an agent, and then discloses information to another market participant (third party). The note establishes a general impossibility result: If the third party has full bargaining power in the interaction with the agent, all incentive-compatible information intermediation mechanisms are uninformative about the agent's type

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Year of publication:	December 31, 2016
Authors:	Dworczak, Piotr
Publisher:	[Stanford, CA] : [Stanford Graduate School of Business]
Subject:	Mechanism Design \| Information Design \| Sequential Agency \| Communication \| Mechanismus-Design-Theorie \| Mechanism design \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Informationsökonomik \| Economics of information \| Kommunikation \| Informationswert \| Information value \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Auktionstheorie \| Auction theory \| Adverse Selektion \| Adverse selection