Mechanism design with partially-specified participation games

This paper considers the implementation of an economic outcome under complete information when the strategic and informational details of the participation game are partially-specified. This means that full participation is required to be a subgame-perfect equilibrium for a large variety of extensive modifications of the simultaneous-move participation game in the same vein as Kalai [Large Robust Games, Econometrica 72 (2004) 1631-1665].

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Year of publication:	2008-10
Authors:	Lamy, Laurent
Institutions:	HAL
Subject:	mechanism design \| robust implementation \| strong Nash equilibrium \| partial subgame perfection \| collusion on participation

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00586068
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010739083