Mechanism design with possibilistic beliefs

We study mechanism design in non-Bayesian settings of incomplete information, when the designer has no information about the players, and the players have arbitrary, heterogeneous, first-order, and possibilistic beliefs about their opponents' payoff types.

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Year of publication:	2015
Authors:	Chen, Jing ; Micali, Silvio
Published in:	Journal of Economic Theory. - Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531. - Vol. 156.2015, C, p. 77-102
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Incomplete information \| Single-good auctions \| First-order beliefs \| Conservative beliefs

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D80 - Information and Uncertainty. General ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D44 - Auctions
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011189740