Mechanism design with possibilistic beliefs
Year of publication: |
March 2015
|
---|---|
Authors: | Chen, Jing ; Micali, Silvio |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 156.2015, p. 77-102
|
Subject: | Incomplete information | Single-good auctions | First-order beliefs | Conservative beliefs | Unvollkommene Information | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Erwartungsbildung | Expectation formation | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Entscheidungstheorie | Decision theory | Auktion | Auction | Erwartungsnutzen | Expected utility | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
-
Endogenous worst-case beliefs in first-price auctions
Gretschko, Vitali, (2018)
-
Subjective expected utility in games
Di Tillio, Alfredo, (2008)
-
Pure information design in classic auctions
Sorokin, Constantine, (2021)
- More ...
-
Robustly Leveraging Collusion in Combinatorial Auctions
Chen, Jing, (2010)
-
Chen, Jing, (2008)
-
Chen, Jing, (2008)
- More ...