Merger and Product Range Rivalery.

The received literature concludes that if scale economies are absent, mergers are often unprofitable under Cornot competition, but always profitable under Bertrand. In a linear demand model with three firms initially, where there are two merger candidates, we show that results will change if we introduce the number of brands as a choice variable.

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Year of publication:	1997
Authors:	Lommerud, K.E. ; Sorgard, L.
Institutions:	Institutt for Økonomi, Universitetet i Bergen
Subject:	MERGERS \| PRODUCTS

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Series:	Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	19 pages
Classification:	L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005487283