Merger in contests

Competition in some markets is a contest. This paper studies the merger incentives in such markets. Merger can be profitable. The profitability depends on the post-merger contest structure, the discriminatory power of the contest and on the number of contestants.

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Year of publication:	2000
Authors:	Huck, Steffen ; Konrad, Kai A. ; Müller, Wieland
Publisher:	Berlin : Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
Subject:	contests \| merger

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Series:	SFB 373 Discussion Paper ; 2000,3
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	722930429 [GVK] hdl:10419/62185 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:sfb373:20003 [RePEc]
Classification:	D44 - Auctions ; L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure Size; Size Distribution of Firms ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010310200