Mimetic herding behavior and the decision to strategically default
Year of publication: |
2014
|
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Authors: | Seiler, Michael J. ; Lane, Mark A. ; Harrison, David M. |
Published in: |
The journal of real estate finance and economics. - Dordrecht : Springer, ISSN 0895-5638, ZDB-ID 1073289-5. - Vol. 49.2014, 4, p. 621-653
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Subject: | Mimetic herding | Strategic mortgage default | Maven | Signal strength | Herdenverhalten | Herding | Hypothek | Mortgage | Theorie | Theory | Signalling | Insolvenz | Insolvency |
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