Minimum wages and excessive effort supply

by Matthias Kräkel and Anja Schöttner

It is well-known that, in static models, minimum wages generate positive worker rents and, consequently, inefficiently low effort. We show that this result does not necessarily extend to a dynamic context. The reason is that, in repeated employment relationships, firms may exploit workers future rents to induce excessively high effort.-- bonuses ; limited liability ; minimum wages

MoreLess

Year of publication:	June 2009
Authors:	Kräkel, Matthias ; Schöttner, Anja
Publisher:	Bonn : Graduate School of Economics
Subject:	Mindestlohn \| Minimum wage \| Leistungsmotivation \| Work motivation \| Arbeitsvertrag \| Labour contract \| Vertragstheorie \| Contract theory \| Theorie \| Theory

freely available

Full text |

More access options

www.bgse.uni-bonn.de

Check Google Scholar

In libraries world-wide (WorldCat)

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

Extent:	Online-Ressource (9 S.)
Series:	Bonn Econ Discussion Papers / BGSE. - Bonn : Univ., ZDB-ID 2124986-6. - Vol. 2009,08
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/37039 [Handle]
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory ; J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003850666