Minority mechanisms in models of agents learning collectively a resource level

Starting from the Minority Game and building more and more sophisticated models of adaptive agents, we show that minority mechanisms underly any model where agents learn collectively a resource level that can be either obvious and constant in time, obvious and time-varying, or hidden.

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Year of publication:	2004
Authors:	Challet, Damien
Published in:	Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications. - Elsevier, ISSN 0378-4371. - Vol. 344.2004, 1, p. 24-29
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Minority mechanisms \| Resource level \| Competition \| Minority game \| El Farol \| Global ultimatum game \| Credit risk models

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010589021