Mitigating risk selection in healthcare entitlement programs : a beneficiary-level competitive bidding approach
Daniel Montanera, Abhay Nath Mishra, T. S. Raghu
| Year of publication: |
2022
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Montanera, Daniel ; Mishra, Abhay Nath ; Raghu, T. S. |
| Published in: |
Information systems research : ISR. - Linthicum, Md. : INFORMS, ISSN 1526-5536, ZDB-ID 2027203-0. - Vol. 33.2022, 4, p. 1221-1247
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| Subject: | auction markets | digital markets | electronic procurement | entitlement programs | game theory | health insurance marketplaces | mechanism design | risk selection | simulations | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Auktion | Auction | Krankenversicherung | Health insurance | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung | Public health insurance | Elektronische Beschaffung | E-procurement |
Online Resource
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1287/isre.2021.1062 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014321702