Mixed Cournot Duopoly with Two Production Periods: The Labour-Managed Firm and the Profit-Maximizing Firm

This paper considers mixed Cournot duopoly competition with two production periods in which labour-managed and profit-maximizing firms compete against each other. The paper demonstrates that there exists a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium that coincides with the Stackelberg outcome in which the profit-maximizing firm is the leader and the labour-managed firm is the follower.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	OHNISHI, KAZUHIRO
Published in:	Indian Economic Review. - Department of Economics. - Vol. 47.2012, 2, p. 183-190
Publisher:	Department of Economics
Subject:	Mixed Cournot duopoly \| Two production periods \| Labour-managed firm \| Profit-maximizing firm

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D21 - Firm Behavior ; L20 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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