Modeling credible retaliation threats in deterring the smuggling of nuclear weapons using partial inspection : a three-stage game
Xiaojun (Gene) Shan; Jun Zhuang
| Year of publication: |
2014
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Shan, Xiaojun ; Zhuang, Jun |
| Published in: |
Decision analysis : a journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences, INFORMS. - Catonsville, MD : Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences, ISSN 1545-8490, ZDB-ID 2141455-5. - Vol. 11.2014, 1, p. 43-62
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| Subject: | noncredible retaliation threats | credible retaliation threats | deterrence | game theory | smuggling | terrorism | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Terrorismus | Terrorism | Illegaler Handel | Illicit trade | Kernwaffe | Nuclear weapon | Glaubwürdigkeit | Credibility |
| Extent: | graph. Darst. |
|---|---|
| Type of publication: | Article |
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010355257