Modifications of Boston, Taiwanese and Chinese mechanisms are not comparable via counting manipulating students
Year of publication: |
2024
|
---|---|
Authors: | Lomakin, Artemii ; Minibaev, Kamil ; Nesterov, Alexander |
Subject: | College admissions | Manipulability | Market design | School choice | Studierende | Students | Schulauswahl | China | Taiwan | Hochschule | Higher education institution | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Manipulation | Matching |
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