Monetary and Fiscal Policy Design Under Emu : A Dynamic Game Approach

This paper analyzes the problem of designing macroeconomic stabilization policies within the European Monetary Union (EMU) as a dynamic game between a centralized monetary authority, the European Central Bank (ECB), and national fiscal policy makers. Non-cooperative feedback Nash equilibrium and cooperative Nash bargaining solutions are determined under various assumptions about rationing regimes in goods and labor markets and structural characteristics of the economies involved

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Year of publication:	[2021]
Authors:	Aarle, Bas van ; Engwerda, Jacob Christiaan ; Plasmans, Joseph E. J. ; Weeren, Arie Johan Theodoor Maria
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Finanzpolitik \| Fiscal policy \| Geldpolitik \| Monetary policy \| Eurozone \| Euro area \| Stabilisierungspolitik \| Stabilization policy \| Dynamische Wirtschaftstheorie \| Economic dynamics \| Dynamisches Spiel \| Dynamic game \| EU-Staaten \| EU countries \| Internationale Wirtschaftspolitik \| International economic policy \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Zwei-Länder-Modell \| Two-country model

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (22 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 2000 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.263949 [DOI]
Classification:	C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; E17 - Forecasting and Simulation ; E52 - Monetary Policy (Targets, Instruments, and Effects) ; E61 - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination ; F33 - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions ; F42 - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10013321074