Monetary technocracy and democratic accountability : how central bank independence conditions economic voting
Year of publication: |
2023
|
---|---|
Authors: | Kim, Hyunwoo |
Published in: |
Review of international political economy. - London [u.a.] : Routledge, ISSN 1466-4526, ZDB-ID 1484979-3. - Vol. 30.2023, 3, p. 939-964
|
Subject: | Central bank independence | clarity of responsibility | democratic accountability | economic voting | monetary policy | Geldpolitik | Monetary policy | Zentralbankunabhängigkeit | Wahlverhalten | Voting behaviour | Demokratie | Democracy |
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