Money talks : rebate mechanisms in reputation system design
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Li, Lingfang ; Xiao, Erte |
Published in: |
Management science : journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, ISSN 0025-1909, ZDB-ID 206345-1. - Vol. 60.2014, 8, p. 2054-2072
|
Subject: | reputation | trust | feedback mechanism | asymmetric information | public good | experimental economics | Reputation | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Vertrauen | Confidence | Öffentliche Güter | Public goods | Experiment | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Experimentelle Ökonomik | Experimental economics | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
-
Trust and reputation under asymmetric information
Janas, Moritz, (2020)
-
Communication, feedbacks and repeated moral hazard with short‐lived buyers
Jullien, Bruno, (2019)
-
Inflated reputations : uncertainty, leniency, and moral wiggle room in trader feedback systems
Bolton, Gary E., (2019)
- More ...
-
What is the cost of venting? : evidence from eBay
Li, Lingfang, (2010)
-
Decision making using rating systems : when scale meets binary
Bargagliotti, Anna E., (2013)
-
A dollar for your thoughts : feedback-conditional rebates on eBay
Cabral, Luís M. B., (2012)
- More ...