Monitoring mechanisms, managerial incentives, investment distortion costs, and derivatives usage
Year of publication: |
January 2018
|
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Authors: | Huang, Jingjing ; Su, Chen ; Joseph, Nathan Lael ; Gilder, Dudley |
Published in: |
The British accounting review : the journal of the British Accounting Association. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0890-8389, ZDB-ID 1015419-X. - Vol. 50.2018, 1, p. 93-141
|
Subject: | Corporate hedging | Corporate governance (CG) | Agency problem | Under/overinvestment | Logistic regression | Hedging | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Derivat | Derivative | Theorie | Theory | Führungskräfte | Managers |
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