Monotonicity and Implementability

Consider an environment with a finite number of alternatives, and agents with private values and quasilinear utility functions. A domain of valuation functions for an agent is a monotonicity domain if every finite-valued monotone randomized allocation rule defined on it is implementable in dominant strategies. We fully characterize the set of all monotonicity domains. Copyright 2010 The Econometric Society.

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Ashlagi, Itai ; Braverman, Mark ; Hassidim, Avinatan ; Monderer, Dov
Published in:	Econometrica. - Econometric Society. - Vol. 78.2010, 5, p. 1749-1772
Publisher:	Econometric Society

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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