Moral hazard and renegotiation in multi-agent incentive contracts when each agent makes a renegotiation offer
Hiroshi Osano
| Year of publication: |
1998
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| Authors: | Osano, Hiroshi |
| Published in: |
Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-2681, ZDB-ID 864321-0. - Vol. 37.1998, 2, p. 207-230
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| Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Theorie | Theory |
| Type of publication: | Article |
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| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001252130