Moral hazard and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm
Year of publication: |
04 July 2019
|
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Authors: | Schmitz, Patrick W. |
Publisher: |
London : Centre for Economic Policy Research |
Subject: | Incomplete Contracts | Ownership rights | Investment incentives | relationship specificity | moral hazard | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Theorie der Unternehmung | Theory of the firm | Eigentumsrechtstheorie | Theory of property rights | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Sachenrecht | Law of property | Investition | Investment | Eigentümerstruktur | Ownership structure |
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