Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices

Auctions in which individuals can purchase more than one unit of the good being sold differ in striking ways from multi-unit auctions in which individuals may purchase only one unit. The uniform price auction in particular frequently yields Nash equilibria in which bidders underbid for their second unit and therefore pay very low prices for the good. This paper characterizes equilibria for the uniform price auction.

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Year of publication:	1998-08-19
Authors:	Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard ; Kahn, Charles M.
Published in:	Economic Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 12.1998, 2, p. 227-258
Publisher:	Springer

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Extent:	application/pdf application/postscript
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	Received: July 31, 1995; revised version: May 28, 1997
Classification:	D44 - Auctions ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005753333