Multilateral externalities : contracts with private information either about costs or benefits
Year of publication: |
April 2016
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Authors: | Helm, Carsten ; Wirl, Franz |
Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 141.2016, p. 27-31
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Subject: | Principal-agent | Contracts | Difference due to allocation of private information | Business as usual | Out-of-contract | Permit market | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Emissionshandel | Emissions trading | Vertrag | Contract | Externer Effekt | Externalities |
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