Multiple Losses, Ex-Ante Moral Hazard, and the Non-Optimality of the Standard Insurance Contract
Year of publication: |
2003-02
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Authors: | Breuer, Michael |
Institutions: | Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakutät |
Subject: | insurance | multiple losses | moral hazard |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Published in Journal of Risk and Insurance 72(4), 2005, pages 525-538 Number 0302 13 pages |
Classification: | D80 - Information and Uncertainty. General ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
Source: |
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Multiple losses, ex-ante moral hazard, and the non-optimality of the standard insurance contract
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