Multiplicity of Equilibria in Multi-Unit Demand Sequential Auctions under Complete Information

We show that the result on the existence of a unique Nash perfect equilibrium in two-bidder multi-unit sequential second-price auctions under complete information (as in Krishna, 1993; Katzman, 1999; and Gale and Stegeman, 2001) is not robust in higher dimensional auctions. Using an example featuring three bidders competing for four objects, we found two equilibria characterized by different vectors of prices and allocations.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Jeddy, Mohamed ; Larue, Bruno
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 32.2012, 1, p. 456-465
Publisher:	AccessEcon
Subject:	sequential auctions \| complete information \| multiple equilibria

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D4 - Market Structure and Pricing ; C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011278835