Multitask principal-agent analyses: incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design
Year of publication: |
2004
|
---|---|
Authors: | Holmström, Bengt ; Milgrom, Paul |
Published in: |
Corporate strategies for managing environmental risk. - Aldershot [u.a.] : Ashgate, ISBN 0-7546-2411-0. - 2004, p. 409-437
|
Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Arbeitsvertrag | Labour contract | Theorie | Theory |
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