Nash equilibrium solutions in multi-agent project scheduling with milestones
Year of publication: |
2021
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Authors: | Šůcha, Přemysl ; Agnetis, Alessandro ; Šidlovský, Marko ; Briand, Cyril |
Published in: |
European journal of operational research : EJOR. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0377-2217, ZDB-ID 243003-4. - Vol. 294.2021, 1 (10.10.), p. 29-41
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Subject: | Flow networks | Lazy-constraint generation | Milestones | Nash equilibria | Project scheduling | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Projektmanagement | Project management | Scheduling-Verfahren | Scheduling problem | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Engpass | Bottleneck |
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