Nash implementable liability rules for judgement-proof injurers
Year of publication: |
Nov. 2004 ; [Elektronische Ressource]
|
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Other Persons: | González, Patrick (contributor) |
Publisher: |
Québec : Dép. d'Economique, Univ. Laval |
Subject: | Haftung | Liability | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Theorie | Theory |
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