Nash implementation in an allocation problem with single-dipped preferences

Ahmed Doghmi

In this paper, we study the Nash implementation in an allocation problem with single-dipped preferences. We show that, with at least three agents, Maskin monotonicity is necessary and sufficient for implementation. We examine the implementability of various social choice correspondences (SCCs) in this environment, and prove that some well-known SCCs are Maskin monotonic ( but they do not satisfy no-veto power) and hence Nash implementable.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Doghmi, Ahmed
Published in:	Games. - Basel : MDPI, ISSN 2073-4336, ZDB-ID 2527220-2. - Vol. 4.2013, 1, p. 38-49
Subject:	Nash implementation \| allocation problem \| single-dipped preferences \| Nash-Gleichgewicht \| Nash equilibrium \| Allokation \| Allocation \| Präferenztheorie \| Theory of preferences \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Neue politische Ökonomie \| Public choice

Extent:	graph. Darst.
Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzung: Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	10.3390/g4010038 [DOI] hdl:10419/98516 [Handle]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10009753711