Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems
In this paper we explore the problem of Nash implementation providing two new properties called I-monotonicity and I-weak no-veto power. These properties form together with unanimity a new sufficient condition for a social choice correspondence to be implementable in Nash equilibria with at least three agents. As applications, we prove that: (1) In private good economies with single-plateaued preferences, each solution of the problem of fair division that has a full range is Nash implementable if and only if it satisfies Maskin monotonicity, (2) In matching problems, Maskin monotonicity is a necessary and sufficient condition for implementation.
Year of publication: |
2015
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Authors: | Doghmi, Ahmed ; Ziad, Abderrahmane |
Published in: |
Mathematical Social Sciences. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-4896. - Vol. 73.2015, C, p. 32-39
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Saved in:
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