Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Feedback Nash Equilibria for the Affine-Quadratic Differential Game

In this note we consider the non-cooperative linear feedback Nash quadratic differential game with an infinite planning horizon. The performance function is assumed to be indefinite and the underlying system affine. We derive both necessary and sufficient conditions under which this game has a Nash equilibrium

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Engwerda, Jacob C. ; Salmah
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Nash-Gleichgewicht \| Nash equilibrium \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Noncooperative game \| Mathematische Optimierung \| Mathematical programming

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